People afflicted with terminal illness 1 rarely die at home. The success of medicine has shifted the locus of dying to public and private health care institutions, 2 thus transferring control over treatment away from the patient and his family to the health care provider and the state. This has been a tacit accommodation to the way health sciences treat the dying, rather than an explicit legal choice.
Anglo-American law starts with the premise of thorough-going self-determination. It follows that each man is considered to be master of his own body, and he may, if he be of sound mind, expressly prohibit the performance of life-saving surgery, or other medical treatment. A doctor might well believe that an operation or form of treatment is desirable or necessary but the law does not permit him to substitute his own judgment for that of the patient by any form of artifice or deception.' 4 While purporting to apply the basic principle, however, courts in different jurisdictions have developed a wide variety of formulations that inhibit realization of ultimate control by the patient. When a court focuses on the doctor's therapeutic privilege to withhold information or bases its determination of the doctor's liability on the disclosure standards observed by the local medical community, the patient's self-determination may be too easily overlooked.
This Note argues that, in accordance with the postulate of selfdetermination, someone other than the health care provider should set the standard and scope of disclosure. Courts should scrutinize with care any accretions to the doctrine of informed consent that diminish the information a patient receives or that circumscribe his entitlement to consent before treatment. The stress some courts place on interests countervailing the Schloendorff axiom may represent an implicit questioning of the validity of that principle. However, this Note contends that probing the underpinnings of the principle will reveal even more fundamental interests which require results consistent with 10. The principle has been noted in some terminal cases as well. the axiom in those cases in which the courts engage in some variety of balancing. Viewed in this light, the doctrine of informed consent requires that any competent patient should retain control over decisions about treatment, even if he is suffering from a terminal illness.' 0 This Note will explore the implications of informed consent for types of voluntary euthanasia.' 6 Most of the implications will suggest guidelines for appropriate judicial results, but the solution to the euthanasia problem may well require legislative changes1 7 to minimize conflict with present homicide and suicide laws.
I. Informed Consent
The doctrine of informed consent emerged from medical malpractice cases involving rendition of some treatment to which the patient had not consented.' 8 Treatment necessarily involves a touching of the patient's body. If performed without a valid consent, it has been viewed as an intentional 9 interference with the person-a battery. 2 Ore. S.B. 179 (active euthanasia) received a "very rough" reception from the newspapers and from letters by the general public. The bill was withdrawn as a result. The Florida bills will apparently be reintroduced for further consideration by the Florida legislature. However, opponents have prepared memorials to Congress encouraging passage of a constitutional amendment apparently intended to overrule Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (legalizing abortions), and perhaps also to prohibit both active and passive euthanasia, even if voluntary. Fla. S. Mem. 162 19. The intent need not be malicious. "Rather it is an intent to bring about a result which will invade the interests of another in a way that the law will not sanction." IV testimony as to the standard medical community practice is not required in a battery action, 2 1 since liability is not based on any standard of care but rather on an unlawful touching. 22 For situations in which the doctor performs a treatment for which no consent whatsoever has been obtained, battery is the appropriate theory for recovery in many jurisdictions. 23 However, in situations in which the patient consents to a treatment but an undisclosed risk materializes, courts have been reluctant to find that the physician has committed an intentional tort. 24 In such cases, physicians have generally been allowed to interpose the defense that disclosure of the risk in question was not customary in the local medical community. 2 5 This encouraged some courts to view insufficient disclosure of risks and alternatives as a failure to exercise due care. 20 A due care standard is doctrinally more consistent with negligence than with battery; therefore a trend has developed to view failure to obtain an informed consent as a tort of negligence.
27

A. Information and Consent
Whether battery or negligence is the theory, 28 informed consent involves the two vital elements its name implies: the patient must be given information on the risks involved in the treatment, and he must assent to the treatment. 2 9 The fiduciary relationship between the doc- (1957) Informed Consent and the Dying Patient tor and patient obligates the doctor to assure the presence of both elements before undertaking a procedure. 30 However, risks which are everyday knowledge need not be mentioned to the patient, 31 and disclosure of "material" risks is sufficient.
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Furthermore, physicians will be held responsible for revealing only such risks as are known to reasonably prudent comparable practitioners. 33 However, courts adopting a negligence theory for informed consent differ greatly over what constitutes a material risk. The view accepted by the majority of American jurisdictions bases the duty to disclose on a community standard; it requires only such disclosure of risks as is consistent with the practice of the local medical community. 34 488 (1967) , the Kansas rule seemed to be that a patient need not submit expert testimony regarding standards for disclosure. However, if the doctor did submit such testimony, then the patient had to rebut. Kansas currently limits the duty to inform to those view of the fiduciary relationship between physician and patient that perceives the doctor's duty to disclose as subservient to his general duty "to do what is best" for the patient. 3 6 The latter duty is a function of the local medical community standard which must be established by expert testimony. 3 7 Since the obligation to disclose is seen as part of, or subservient to, the more general duty, the standard of disclosure is described as a question of medical judgment. Thus no disclosure is required unless expert testimony indicates that otherwise the relevant standard of medical care would be breached. 3 s This view, however, threatens to emasculate the individual self-determination which the doctrine of informed consent was meant to protect. 39 The patient's right to select treatment is severely limited when it is based only on information deemed worthy of disclosure according to a medical community standard set by those under the obligation to inform. 40 Thus the medical community standard test runs contrary to vesting ultimate determination of treatment questions in the patient and diminishes rather than assures his self-determination. 41 cluded that the patient must be given all material information necessary for a decision. The character of material information could not be determined by a "local medical group" which has no knowledge of the individual or the unique situation involved.
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The court reasoned that the decision as to materiality is a human judgment which does not require expert medical testimony, but may be determined by the jury. 50 Disclosure should extend to all facts which a reasonable man would regard as materialF' in light of the severity of the risk and the likelihood of its occurrence-the more severe or likely the risk, the more probable that it is material.
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Wilkinson also discussed causation. To recover in a malpractice action for lack of informed consent, the patient must show not only that the physician failed to disclose a material fact, but also that he, the patient, would have refused consent had he been informed of the fact, and that he has been injured as a result of the concealment. 3 The focus is on what the particular patient would have done, thus wisely making the causation test more subjective than the materiality requirement.
49. The court notes that the basis of informed consent is "the patient's right to be the final judge to do with his body as he wills." This right "should not be delegated to a local medical group." Id. However, Wilkinson unduly restricted recovery to cases in which the patient would have refused treatment altogether. The rule should be broader. If the patient shows that, had he been warned, he would have delayed consent in order to attend to personal or business matters, 5 4 he should recover for damages 55 which he can prove resulted from the concealment. Such a modified rule would be consistent with the requirement of causation for tort liability, 56 while increasing the scope of protection consistently with the reasons for informed con-
The California Supreme Court in Cobbs v. Grant" 8 also began with the familiar postulate of self-determination over one's body as the basis for requiring that the physician disclose to his patient "all information relevant to a meaningful decisional process." 5 9 This court, rejecting the community standard rule as "overbroad" and "nebulous," opted for a standard more protective of patient's rights. Cobbs required that known risks of death or serious bodily harm be disclosed. The test for adequate disclosure is the patient's need for information, , treats failure to obtain informed consent as a breach of duty which results in liability in damages for any undisclosed risk that materializes, whether or not the therapy was otherwise nonnegligently performed. Waltz & Scheuneman, supra note 8, at 649, criticize this position as allowing an unjustifiably large recovery in cases which really involve no malpractice, and propose that damages should be the difference between the patient's condition with no treatment (or alternative treatment if such is available) and his condition after the risk materialized. Since valuation could well be difficult if alternatives are available, they suggest that the Natanson test may be employed in such cases. However, failure to obtain an informed consent itself constitutes malpractice. Failure to inform is increasingly viewed as a breach of duty creating a tort in negligence. Trogun v. Fruchtman, 58 Wis. 2d 569, 597, 207 N.W.2d 297, 312-13 (1973). If informed consent actions are otherwise treated as malpractice cases, the measure of damages should also be the malpractice measure: the damage resulting from the breach of duty. In informed consent cases, the breach of duty is the failure to inform. The damage is the materialized undisclosed risk which the patient could not avoid because he was not informed. This causation test is inappropriate in informed consent cases. The California court should have applied the objective test only to determine the required scope of disclosure-the materiality issue-as the Rhode Island court did. 3 The doctor should be held responsible only for disclosing risks a reasonable man would deem material. 0 4 If a more subjective standard forcing the doctor to guess at the need to disclose reasonably immaterial risks were adopted, his liability would be dependent on the vagaries of each patient's desire for information., However, once a fact has been found objectively material, the patient should be allowed recovery if he can show that he would have refused treatment, even unreasonably. 6 6 In other words, the test of causation should be more subjective. 6 7 This individualized test of causation is indicated because informed consent seeks to assure patients the right to make even irrational decisions. Therefore, the patient's act of refusal cannot be weighed by an objective or reasonable man test, nor need it be, since nondisclosure of a material risk is the central element.
Wilkinson properly isolates and concentrates with an objective test on the question of materiality. Cobbs likewise is a step in the right direction for it abolishes the community standard as to what risks will 60. Id. at 245, 502 P.2d at 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 515 (1972 
B. Underpinnings of the Doctrine
Judicial deviation from the basic principle of informed consentself-determination over one's own body6 9 -perhaps results from a failure to probe the underpinnings of that axiom. 0 The principle implies that there exist categories of decisions which an individual must be permitted to make, even if others believe the individual decides irrationally or incorrectly.7 1 It indicates that an implicit weighing of the interests of competing decisionmakers has already taken place and that the balance has been resolved in favor of individual choice. Burger, then a circuit judge, felt that a hospital's effort to compel a person against her will to accept a blood transfusion was not justiciable: "Some matters of essentially private concern and others of enormous public concern, are beyond the reach of judges." 118 U.S. App. D.C. at 98, 331 F.2d at 1018. Burger alludes to notions of privacy in his discussion of the allocation of decisionmaking power. He notes that Justice Brandeis, in speaking of the "'right to be let alone' . . . intended to include a great many foolish, unreasonable and even absurd ideas which do not conform, such as refusing medical treatment even at great risk." Cf. Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 624, 295 A.2d 676, 687-88 (1972).
73. Mill's structure has been challenged. "The Millsian distinction between instances of harm to others and instances of harm solely to self, relied on by the majority, would seem rarely if ever to be relevant in actuality because others are affected by virtually any action which an individual takes or fails to take. One problem with Mill's distinction between direct and indirect effects is that individuals are affected by psychological phenomena as well as physical or material phe-the decisionmaker. 7 4 Alternatively, courts may come increasingly to view informed consent as a manifestation of constitutionally protected privacy, especially after Roe v. Wade. 75 However, courts have explored nomena. The distinction might be salvaged by viewing emotional impact as an indirect effect. In addition, it is arguable that purely psychological effects may be more easily (cheaply) borne by the psychologically affected party, as compared to the psychological effect of denying to an individual the right to make a decision physically affecting only himself; cf. YWCA v. Kugler, 342 F. Supp. 1048, 1073 (D.N.J. 1972) (court holds a New Jersey abortion statute unconstitutional and suggests that no authority has been advanced for the contention that for purposes of general welfare a state may infringe constitutional rights). The importance of psychological effects will be discussed later. See pp. 1660-61 infra.
The motorcycle crash helmet cases suggest some of the difficulties in allocating decisionmaking power for choices that appear primarily to affect only given individuals. A Pennsylvania lower court recognized the connection between privacy and the right to refuse. In a case involving the refusal of a chronic undifferentiated schizophrenic to submit to cancer therapy, the court upheld her freedom to refuse declaring:
In our opinion the constitutional right of privacy [citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)] includes the right of a mature competent adult to refuse to accept medical recommendations that may prolong one's life and which, to a third person at least, appear to be in his best interests; in short, that the right of privacy includes a right to die with which the State should not interfere where there are no minor or unborn children and no clear and present danger to public health, welfare or morals. If the person was competent while being presented with the decision and in making the decision which she did, the Court should not interfere even though her decision might be considered unwise, foolish or ridiculous.
the connection between informed consent and constitutional doctrine most in the context of freedom of religion. T 1 Competent, informed patients have been held entitled to refuse treatment solely because of religious beliefs, even if the treatment is necessary to preserve their lives. 1 7 Constitutional rights may thus indeed lie at the foundation of informed consent doctrine, but the issue remains far from settled. 78 The doctrine's underpinnings, however, may also be explained in terms more commonly applied to tort doctrine in general. To the extent that tort law seeks to achieve an efficient allocation of resources, it aspires to place the responsibility for particular decisions upon the Civ. Ricirs individuals who can best avoid costs arising from that decisionmaking. 7 9 This cost avoidance includes an effort to reduce the number and severity of incorrect decisions, and an attempt to reduce the costs of gathering and considering information in making decisions. 8 0 Decisionmaking for purposes of informed consent may be evaluated in terms of cost avoidance. The physician is primarily an expert in diagnosis and treatment who can determine at less expense than the patient the desirability of a particular treatment from a medical point of view. However, the physician is not equipped to evaluate a treatment in terms of a patient's nonmedical needs. The cost to the physician of discovering all the patient's psychological, social, and business needs and obligations is simply too great. Only the patient knows sufficiently his own value preferences, capacity for pain and suffering, future business and social plans, and religious beliefs to evaluate the desirability of a particular treatment so it will maximize the patient's satisfaction. Moreover, a system which overtly ignored the individual values of patients might encourage them to avoid or delay consulting physicians for fear that their values would be disregarded.$' This would risk deterioration of health standards at considerable cost to society as individuals neglected to seek medical advice.
This analysis suggests that the most efficient decisionmaking method for medical treatment places responsibility on the physician to make sufficient medical disclosures to his patients. On the basis of both the medical information and his own values, the patient would then be responsible for evaluating alternative procedures proposed by the physician and for making the ultimate decision as to the most appropriate treatment. The physician would be liable for insufficient disclosure, but the patient would bear the risks of the treatment or nontreatment which he selected after receiving adequate information. As the previous discussion indicated, recent informed consent cases have 
II. Implications for Euthanasia
Society engages in a denial of death. 8 3 This denial of death entails two attitudes which must be squarely confronted and overcome in order to achieve reasoned discussion of voluntary euthanasia. First, the denial has encouraged the view that society attaches unqualified paramount value to human life, or, put another way, that society engages in thoroughgoing protection of life. In actuality such protection is an illusion, for society has tended to prevent only direct takings of life, while permitting the indirect, but statistically certain, deaths. s4 For example, the recent reduction of speed limits on highways during the energy shortage made clear that the higher speeds tolerated for years have resulted in a substantially higher death toll. s6 Death of a human being should be of equal concern whether direct or indirect. Direct takings, however, would confront the denial by shattering the illusion, whereas the illusion may be maintained when the takings are indirect. Voluntary euthanasia is sufficiently open and direct 8 6 that it constitutes an explicit challenge to the illusion.
Second, denial of death has made many unable to appreciate that a dying person may accept the prospect of death "with equanimity 82. This analysis applies to other than doctor-patient relations. See Fleming v. Delta Airlines, 359 F. Supp. 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (airline owes duty to warn passengerin this case a doctor-of expected turbulence so that he might choose for himself whether he is "physically and emotionally capable of undertaking the trip" and wishes to do so), noted in 42 FORDHAN L. REV 387 (1969) . Calabresi points out that society seems quite willing to trade lives in order to achieve cheaper social progress. For example, society knows statistically that deaths will result from unsafe mines, automobiles, and airports but nevertheless refuses to spend the money to save the lives. Ely adverts to the anomaly of society's preference for "indirect" as opposed to "direct" taking of life as "the psychological phenomenon that keeps bombardiers sane-the fact that it is somehow easier to 'terminate' those you cannot see .... ." Ely, supra note 75, at 927. Adverse psychological effects of direct taking of life do, however, affect people's utility curves. Once one begins to see through these attitudes, the question becomes not, "Why make an exception permitting a death?" but rather, "What exceptions should be made?" 8 9 This latter question may be addressed in part through the doctrine of informed consent.
The patient's right to an informed consent makes no sense without a right to an informed refusal. The right to refuse should be extended to the dying patient, for his decision on proffered treatment is no different from that involved in any other medical situation.9 0 The individual continues to know best his own value preferences, capacity for pain and suffering, and uncompleted business and social obligations. He remains the optimal cost avoider.
The problem of euthanasia can be viewed as a continuum of situations requiring implementation of the patient's right to be the decisionmaker. At one end of the continuum is the nonterminal patient confronted with risks and alternatives in selecting treatment. Next is the terminal patient deciding whether to submit to life-sustaining therapy. Further along the continuum comes the terminal patient 87. E. KUBLER-Ross, supra note 2, at 112-37; A. WEISMAN requesting the discontinuance of a life-sustaining treatment. Finally there is the terminal patient requesting that his life be shortened by rendition of a death-inducing agent.
The doctrine of informed consent requires that the competent, nonterminal patient in a nonemergency situation be given a chance to consent or refuse. 9 1 The situation is no different for the terminal patient advised by his doctor to undergo a particular treatment. He should likewise have a choice, since the decision involved is analytically the same as in the first case. 92 However, the case of the competent terminal patient requesting discontinuance of life-sustaining treatment presents several problems. Arguably, once a patient submits to a life-sustaining treatment, the physician has an obligation not only to him but also to society to maintain him, as a minimum, in his present condition. 93 In addition, a patient is sometimes viewed as submitting to the physician's "professional standards" or "school of practice" when he requests treatment. 94 According to this view, the physician may thereafter treat the patient according to his school, which may mean that termination of treatment before death will not be permitted.
This argument forces the patient to choose between extreme alternatives. The patient is compelled either to forego treatment altogether or, once treatment commences, to submit completely to the physician's decisions. This failure to honor the patient's decision to terminate treatment converts the initial consent into a contract of adhesion from which the patient is permitted no escape even though new facts might be brought to his attention after his initial consent.
The primary duty of the physician should not be only to act in the best interests of the patient as defined by some school of practice, but rather to act in the best interests of the patient as the patient himself views those best interests. Self-determination, the basis of informed consent, implies that a competent patient must have the right to redefine his best interests for the duration of a medical procedure. Hence, the patient should be able to withdraw his consent at any time and discontinue the treatment.
This passive euthanasia presents fewer difficulties than the final case of active rendition of a death-inducing agent once a competent terminal patient so requests. In that situation, another person is involved who assists in ending the patient's life. Such assistance renders the person liable to prosecution for homicide. Nor can this conclusion be escaped by analyzing the other's act as merely an extension of the patient's will 9 " since consent is not usually a defense to homicide. 9 Nevertheless, the difficulty of distinction between active and passive euthanasia should be recognized. Because these cases are on a continuum, there may be little or no substantive difference between termination of treatment and active rendition of a death-provoking agentyt Termination of treatment may involve turning off a respirator switch whereas active rendition may involve giving an injection. A physical act by a third person which promotes a less prolonged dying process is involved in each instance. Termination, however, may seem less direct than active rendition and therefore more acceptable. On the other hand, active rendition maximizes the self-determination of the terminal patient by allowing the maximal choice over the timing of death. The alternatives in the terminal situation are not living or dying; they are either a prolonged death or a quicker death that maintains what the patient regards as his dignity. Granting choice over timing of death to -a terminal patient need not conflict with concern for preservation of life. Preservation of life becomes grotesque when forced on a competent terminal patient who prefers a more rapid end. Concepts of sanctity of life should be recognized as not absolute; 9 8 they do not inevitably imply that society should deny the decision of a terminal patient electing euthanasia, either active or passive. 99
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See, e.g., Note, supra note 16, at 694.
See S. KADISH & M. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 15 (2d ed. 1969)
(consent is no defense except in some sports contests). 99. Two recent proposals for the rendition of euthanasia neglect the implications of informed consent. Glanville Williams, recognizing the precarious legal position of health care providers in deciding on proper treatment of terminal patients, has called for legislation leaving euthanasia to the physician's discretion. Williams, Euthanasia, 41 MEDICO-LEGAL J. 14, 16 (1973). Williams favors a statute legalizing euthanasia in order to minimize the risk of lawsuits. The second proposal is to analyze the discontinuance of treatment as an omission, rather than as an act, thus producing no criminal liability.
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III. Closing Competency Loopholes
Even in those jurisdictions which have eliminated the medical community standard as the test for adequacy of disclosure, physicians may still escape liability for failure to disclose material information. This is true for two reasons. First, the patient may be deemed incompetent, in which case information need be provided not to the patient but only to the family. 100 Second, the physician might feel the patient would be "upset" by the information and therefore withhold the relevant facts on grounds of therapeutic privilege. 101 These grounds for failing to provide information may be abused, creating a loophole through which the implications of informed consent may be avoided. Because of his lack of expertise in comparison to the physician, the patient must rely heavily upon the doctor for information concerning the quality and nature of the treatment. It has been suggested that physicians in fact attempt to manipulate or However, turning off a respirator and failing to turn on a respirator which is automatically programmed to stop every 24 hours, are not morally different; distinguishing the former as an act seems artificial. See id. at 21. See also Fletcher, Prolonging Life, 42 WASH. L. REV. 999, 1007 (1967); Kamisar, supra note 93, at 982 n.41. Because the distinction between acts and omissions is vague, an effort has been made to lend substance to the "act" versus "omission" dichotomy by looking to standard medical practice in a community to determine whether the doctor's behavior constitutes an act or omission. See Fletcher, supra; cf. Gurney, supra note 5, at 243-44. The argument is that if doctors do not generally treat a dying patient under certain circumstances, then failure to treat is an omission and no liability arises.
Neither doctor nor profession should have legal discretion to determine whether euthanasia will be rendered; cf. Hearings on Dying, supra note 5, at 75. If a decision to die is to be made, it should be made by the patient himself if competent, and not by the patient's physician or by a medical community standard. Further, there is evidence that doctors are neither trained nor better able to make the decision. See 1064 (1972) . In economic terms, this reliance is the product of the high cost to the patient of informing himself of the relevant medical information other than through his physicians. He cannot readily determine for himself the quality of the care which he is receiving, and must rely on self-regulation by physicians, or on standards set by law to assure that quality medical services are provided.
enhance patient uncertainty in order to preserve power over the patient in the doctor-patient relationship. 1 0 3 Such control over the patient, being contrary to interests in self-determination sought to be protected by informed consent, must be restrained. Consequently, the courts should be particularly alert to prevent manipulation of the patient. This concern may be expressed by the formulation of adequate legal safeguards to control determinations of competency and the use of therapeutic privilege.
Unfortunately, some courts tend to confuse competency to consent with competency to receive certain "upsetting" information. 04 Further, even when the concepts are kept separate, adequate legal tests protective of patient interests have not been forthcoming. This Note will examine separately the two notions, and offer approaches designed to maintain and safeguard patient self-determination.
A. Competency to Consent
Courts generally except from the requirement of informed consent persons who are not competent. 05 Information need not be tendered nor consent obtained from an incompetent patient, though an informed consent must be obtained from the patient's guardian. 00 The definition of competency is critical. It must be formulated consistently with the objective of informed consent-to secure for the patient the right to forego treatment even if the medical profession or society . This is not to suggest that all physicians manipulate uncertainty, nor that the medical profession has a monopoly on such manipulation.
104. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972), presents a test for competency which may reflect confusion with physicians' claims of therapeutic privilege to withhold upsetting information from the patient:
A disclosure need not be made beyond that required within the medical community when a doctor can prove by a preponderance of the evidence [that] he relied upon facts which would demonstrate to a reasonable man the disclosure would have so seriously upset the patient that the patient would not have been able to dispassionately weigh the risks of refusing to undergo the recommended treatment. Id. at 246, 502 P.2d at 12, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 516.
The requirement of dispassionate evaluation of risks undermines the doctrine of informed consent which requires that a patient be permitted to refuse treatment even for reasons others regard as irrational or hastily conceived. Further, Cobbs does not explain why medical community standards exist for disclosure to incompetent patients. Elsewhere in the opinion the court strongly criticized the notion of medical community standards, calling them "nebulous" and charging that they vest doctors "with virtual absolute discretion." Id. at 243, 502 P.2d at 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 514. would feel the reasons to be irrational. 0 7 At the outset, it should be noted that competency may be defined in different ways for different purposes.' 08 Therefore, the discussion following will elaborate a concept of competency applicable specifically for informed consent to medical treatment.
Judicial opinions dealing with informed consent generally do not articulate tests for competency. Apparently courts are usually content to rely on physicians' unguided judgments as to what constitutes competency to consent. However, some courts have been successful in establishing a legal test for competency which both serves the interests of informed consent and avoids confusion with therapeutic privilege.
The Supreme Court of Washington set forth such a test of competency in Grannum v. Berard. 10 9 Competency is presumed; to overcome this presumption, clear, cogent, and convincing evidence is necessary. The test of competency is the same as that used to determine the capacity of an individual to execute an agreement. 110 Thus, the question is whether the person at the time of making the agreement possessed sufficient reason to understand the nature, terms, and effect of the agreement."' This test focuses on the patient's capacity to comprehend his situation, risks, and alternatives. It does not import an examination of whether the patient's choice is rational or dispassionately conceived, but allows a patient to make decisions which may seem to others to be unreasonable."1 2
B. Therapeutic Privilege: The Patient's Competency to Receive Certain Information
Many courts have permitted doctors to exercise a therapeutic privilege to withhold information which they believe might seriously upset or depress patients. apparently competent patient. In Nishi v. Hartwell, 114 a recent Hawaiian case, information was concealed from a competent patient on grounds of therapeutic privilege, and was also concealed from the patient's wife. The court held that no disclosure to the family was necessary, since the patient was competent, even when information was concealed from the patient to avoid "upsetting" him." 15 This decision fails to consider the interest of the patient and his family in receiving information so they might prepare for contingencies. Furthermore, it fails to provide protection against manipulating the consent of the patient by selective provision of information. Finally, although the Hawaii court avoided this analysis, the invocation of therapeutic privilege implies a judgment that the patient is incompetent to receive certain material information which might be distressing. It is contradictory at the same time to view him as competent to consent. Meaningful consent requires disclosure of material information. If a patient is not competent to receive all material information, then he is not competent to give a valid consent.
In such a case consent should be sought from an informed family or guardian.
Canterbury v. Spence" 0 6 recognized that the "physician's privilege to withhold information for therapeutic reasons must be carefully circumscribed . . . for otherwise it might devour the disclosure rule itself." 11 7 Canterbury unfortunately places only an outer limit on the privilege," l8 but it does suggest that disclosure to a close relative is necessary if the privilege is exercised. The opinion represents a move- 114. 52 Hawaii 188, 473 P.2d 116 (1970). In this case, a "well-educated" dentist was not told about the hazards of injection of radio-opaque contrast medium as he was "frightened," had hypertension, and had heart disease, even though he was "mentally competent and had the capacity to act." The dentist was paralyzed from the waist down with loss of control of his bowel and bladder, a known risk of the contrast medium. This recognition is not surprising since claims of therapeutic privilege to conceal information achieve the same results as assertions of a community standard against disclosure. Since Canterbury rejected the community standard rule, the court quite properly applied the same logic to cut back therapeutic privilege.
118. Id. The court forbade "paternalistic" use of the privilege to engineer a competent patient's consent to an operation by withholding information which might prompt the patient to forego the treatment. ment toward viewing invocation of therapeutic privilege as equivalent to an assertion that the patient is incompetent.
Doctors would be caught between Scylla and Charybdis'" if they are restricted in the use of therapeutic privilege but yet are held liable for making frightening disclosures to competent patients. Unfortunately there are indications in some jurisdictions that physicians will be held liable in damages for mental anguish caused by disclosures. 120 Any tendency of the law in the direction of holding doctors liable for any honest disclosures must be closely scrutinized, for it may impede the flow of material information to the patient.
In place of permissive judicial approaches allowing therapeutic privilege and of intimations that physicians may be liable for frightening disclosures, the law should concentrate on developing a duty to inform patients carefully of material information, even if it is distressing.' 2 1 Requiring a tactful disclosure would provide the patient with the information necessary to make an informed decision while avoiding excessive discomfort in the patient. 22 The interest in selfdetermination of a competent patient is not served by distorted infor- 121. Cf. Inglis, supra note 120. 122. Cf. Hearings on Dying, supra note 5, at 11 (Kilbler-Ross testified that dying patients could receive information as long as they were given "hope").
mation.1 23 Furthermore, there is evidence that patients desire a full disclosure, even of distressing information. 2 4 Courts should permit only one exception to this rule of full tactful disclosure. A physician should exercise a therapeutic privilege to withhold information from a competent patient when the patient expressly waives his right to a disclosure. 125 However, in order to avoid abuse, courts should insist that the waiver be express and unequivocal, and not a doctor's inference from subjective impressions of the competent patient's behavior.
C. Competency and the Dying Patient
It might be argued that a decision by a terminal patient to refuse treatment provides prima facie evidence of mental incompetency or is itself so irrational that it should be disregarded. However, given the patient's implicit choice between prolonged dying or more rapid death, a decision to die may be quite reasonable even if other individuals or groups in our society judge it unacceptable for themselves. If a terminal patient were to decide to die for what others would deem irrational reasons, the decision should still be honored; informed consent protects all decisions by competent patients, rational or irrational. 1325 (1971) . This study of patients informed of "serious" complications of angiography concludes that "the vast majority of patients desired this information" and "a straightforward statement of complications will result in only a small percentage of patients refusing a special procedure." Id. at 1329. 1064 (1972) , citing Note, supra note 8, at 1545-51. Thus it may be argued that the importance of selfdetermination is so great that informed consent may never be waived in a nonemergency situation. However, waiver may be acceptable if courts ensure that the patient is not intimidated into waiving an informed consent by pressure from a hurried physician. If the patient clearly understands that the physician would willingly give the information and that waiver means that the physician will make the final decisions, waiver might be permitted, since the patient may determine that the emotional cost to himself of the information or of the decisionmaking is too great.
127. See note 90 supra. competent to refuse life-saving surgery even though the patient's grounds for refusal were considered by some as irrational.
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Some commentators have argued that terminal patients may be particularly vulnerable to the influence of family members, drugs, pain, or financial factors.
13 0 These contentions basically pose the problem of coercion of the terminal patient's decision. Coercion1 3 ' may take the form of subtle pressure from other individuals, unconscious motivations, or simple failures to comprehend information in the form in which it is conveyed. The concern is that coercion of the terminal patient's decision will increase the number and frequency of incorrect decisions by the patient-decisions which are irreversible' 3 2 -imposing societal costs greater than the costs if the responsibility were placed on the individual's family, physicians and the state. If that were the case, it might be argued that the state should override the patient's expressed will. However, the state should avoid coercing an individual to protect him from coercion if some less drastic way of vindicating the state's interests is available. The state can structure its approach so that only patients who are relatively uncoerced may make the ultimate decision as to treatment, striving to assure that the patient makes the decision with genuine understanding a ' 33 of information material to the decision. Furthermore, even if the issue is a close one, interests in privacy argue that society opt for an approach encouraging selfdetermination; voluntary euthanasia is not espoused simply to alle-129. Id. at 2-3. The case involved a 60-year-old with possible breast cancer. At the hearing, she focused on fear of surgery as a reason for refusal. Other witnesses suggested that the patient's reasons included, inter alia, the fear that the operation would prevent a movie career. 132. Kamisar argues that voluntary euthanasia should not be permitted because "the consequence of error is so irreparable," Kamisar, supra note 93, at 1013. Kamisar's point is apparently that the patient may be nonterminal. That the refusal of treatment in a nonterminal situation may result in harm is, however, a part of the price the doctrine of informed consent must pay in order to assure self-determination. The way to reduce possible error is to maximize the supply of accurate information to the decisionmaker (here, the competent patient), not to deprive him of choice.
133 viate pain, 3 4 but rather to preserve to the terminal patient his last meaningful freedom, that of control over the time of his death.
13 If the terminal patient is competent according to the Grannum test, 13 then he has the same right to self-determination through informed consent as his brethren with more comforting prospects for longevity.
There is evidence that nondisclosure to dying patients is an accepted practice among doctors. 1 3 7 Apparently, a strong feeling exists that a dying patient would be shocked, depressed, or otherwise adversely affected if he were acquainted with the facts, or that he usually knows he is dying anyway.' 3 8 On the other hand, from the patient's point of view, a majority of Americans want to be able to tell their doctor to let them die if they suffer from an incurable condition. 3 Furthermore, dignity of the patient, informed consent, and the opportunity to arrange one's affairs dictate that the patient should be told of his condition.
By either ignoring the dying patient's wishes as irrational or failing to inform the patient of his condition in the first place, the issue of competency has often been used by the medical profession to make its own decisions as to what treatment to give terminal patients. 140 Thus, courts should carefully consider the competency test. Therapeutic privilege should not expand into a presumption of incompetency, with the result of denying to the patient the right to render an informed consent or to make his own decision about euthanasia.
IV. Needed Legislative Changes
Uncertainty regarding the law of suicide and homicide has prompted many to feel that legislation authorizing some forms of euthanasia is desirable. 14 1 Legislation would reduce fears of liability 142 for ccmplicity in certain forms of voluntary euthanasia by health care providers and thus allow them to honor their patients' wishes.
Originally suicide 143 was a felony punishable by driving a stake through the body and burying the corpse under a public highway. All of the suicide's property was forfeited to the sovereign. 1 4 4 A mellowing 45 of legal attitudes toward suicide has occurred so that it is no longer a crime in some jurisdictions; 14 however, in a few others, suicide remains a felony or misdemeanor. 147 Some have argued that it is proper to forbid suicide because every life has value to society and may not be taken even by self-destruction. 4 This argument suggests that the cost of the suicide of an individual is too great in terms of lost productive potential and psychological damage to other persons in society. However strong the argument with respect to suicide in general, it merits close scrutiny in the voluntary euthanasia situation.
Three basic scenarios are presented. First, there is the case of the dying patient refusing treatment but for whom no treatment could effect a recovery. This patient has little in terms of productive potential to offer society. Though third parties might suffer disutility 140 from a decision to refuse treatment, this psychological loss is presumably minimal since the patient is competent, voluntarily making the decision, and would die relatively soon anyway. Further, commitment to self-determination and privacy presupposes a disposition to permit activities whose adverse impact on others is only psychological. 5 0 Since the opportunity to refuse treatment may be very important to many patients, 15 deprivation of this choice may be a considerable cost that is not outweighed by the adverse psychological impact on others.
Second is the case of a dying patient who could recover but refuses treatment. The primary example is that of an individual who refuses on religious grounds. This patient presumably does have productive potential for society. However, this society, generally committed to a free market economy, normally refrains from compelling individuals to maximize their productive potential; indeed, there are instances where it encourages considerable waste of productive potential.
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Thus, an individual decision to cease productive contribution to society does not support abridging a patient's right to refuse treatment. Any psychological harm to others must be balanced against commitments to religious freedom,5 3 as well as interests in privacy and self-determination.' 4 Again, deprivation of patients' choices may be at such considerable cost as to overcome adverse psychological impact on others.
Finally, there is the problem of the dying patient who requests active rendition of a death-inducing agent. The opportunity to obtain active euthanasia increases the choices available to a competent patient and may reduce his costs by allowing him to select such a procedure if it maximizes his satisfaction. Certainly active rendition could eliminate considerable suffering during a prolonged and irreversible dying process. The suffering may impose substantial costs not only on the patient but on his family and health care providers as well. However, active euthanasia generally involves the participation of an identifiable third party in its provision. Such participation may be at considerable psychological cost to the third party and to society. Hence, as long as a third party is heavily involved, the argument is stronger for society to forbid voluntary active euthanasia.1 55 A strong argument often advanced for prohibiting suicide is that decisions for self-destruction are not firmly held and may be only pleas for help.1 50 However, there is evidence that many people who 152. See 155. Third party involvement and consequent psychological costs have been minimized in some plans for rendition of active euthanasia. It has been suggested that third parties be permitted to place poison beside a dying patient on request of the patient. The patient would administer the poison to himself. "Switzerland permits the doctor to put poison in the hand of the patient but not actually to administer it himself." Rudikoff, supra note 135, at 62. Apparently a similar situation existed in Texas until January 1, 1974. See note 165 infra. This position decreases involvement of third parties, for the final act is performed solely by the patient. Indeed, the third party involvement seems akin to "unplugging" a life support apparatus which had been sustaining the patient.
Of course, the political feasibility of even voluntary passive euthanasia legislation is questionable. Oregon State Senator Hoyt, a sponsor of House Bill 2997 (legalizing passive euthanasia) in the 1973 session of the Oregon legislature, has concluded that euthanasia legislation is not politically possible: "Legislation has to follow public opinion, it cannot lead it ......
He has decided "reluctantly to take the subject out of the political arena and depend on social education." Letter from State Senator take their own lives do so with determination and conviction.1 57 This observation logically applies with special force to dying patients seeking a form of euthanasia, and consequently the sanction against suicide is less defensible when applied to this group.' 6 8 Thus, policies prohibiting suicide might be limited to apply only to nonterminal cases. Alternatively, definitions could be changed to make clear that voluntary passive euthanasia is not suicide.
The issue of liability for euthanasia has seldom reached the courts.DD Perhaps this is due to prosecutorial discretion, 160 but it is more likely due to difficulty of proof,"' or simply to failure of authorities to discover the situation. 62 Nonetheless, dictum in some jurisdictions indicates that complicity in active euthanasia even by a well-intentioned physician would constitute sufficient malice for a murder prosecution.' 63 In others, statutes indicate that assistance in euthanasia amounts to the crime of aiding and abetting suicide. 64 In still others, in the absence of a specific statute regarding aiding suicide, such assistance may be murder, manslaughter, or no violation of the law. 00 Passive euthanasia provides a more difficult problem; commentators nately, most living wills are so vague that they offer little confidence in the adequacy of safeguards for euthanasia under their aegis.'" The scheme which this Note suggests does not involve great complexity or bureaucratization. The terminal patient, like the nonterminal patient, is entitled to refuse treatment. 7 6
Conclusion
The individual's right to self-determination over his own body is frequently asserted as the axiomatic foundation of informed consent. Recent informed consent cases abolishing the medical community standard rule for disclosure have returned to a position of greater consistency with the Schloendorff axiom. It is fundamental to the doctrine that a right to consent presupposes a right to refuse. Hence, if courts take informed consent seriously, they must recognize the right of a competent terminal patient to forego treatment.
Countervailing concerns about the psychological impact of refusals of treatment upon society are not strong enough to overcome the law's commitment to decisionmaking by the individual with respect to his own medical treatment. Society's interests in minimizing incorrect decisions may be met by proper tests for competency and by measures to assure sufficient comprehension of relevant material information. The outcome remains the same: recognition of the patient's right to refuse, whether the patient is terminal or not.' 7 Through application of developing tort doctrine, the courts alone might achieve this result. However, legislation which dispels the fear of possible criminal liability in cases of voluntary euthanasia is desirable. Lawmakers should mitigate the uncertainties and generate adequate legal measures to permit a dignified death.
175. Living wills might be individually tailored to mitigate some of the uncertainties as to actual intent under particular circumstances, and also to display thorough comprehension of the document signed. 
